



HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL CHANNELS

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CORONA

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
4 AUG 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: CORONA Mission 1005 Incident

1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. CORONA mission 1005 was launched on 27 April into orbit. Recovery attempts commencing 2 May were unsuccessful. Attached hereto is a chronology of operational reporting received on this mission.
3. On 5 August, OSA received word from its security representative at the Air Force Special Projects Center, Los Angeles, California, that a satellite capsule had been reported as coming down near the Venezuelan-Columbia border. The actions taken by OSA upon receipt of this information are detailed in a separate attachment.
4. As a result of the investigation made by OSA in conjunction with Caracas station and the Embassy Attache office there, the following facts are noted:
 - 1 August - First word received by Caracas Army Attache office of finding of a capsule at La Fria, 500 miles southwest of Caracas in a remote region of the Andes.
 - 3 August - Reconfirmation of capsule finding made by telephone call to Caracas Embassy.
 - 4 August - Representatives of the Embassy viewed capsule at San Cristobal to which it had been moved by political police. First press stories appeared.
 - 5 August - Capsule flown by host government to Caracas.
 - 6 August - Capsule held by Minister of Defense, Venezuela.
 - 10 August

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5. Capsule was seen by a large number of Venezuelans, including officials from military police, G-2, Minister of Defense. Photos were taken by host government as well as commercial photographer, and a local newspaper. It is believed that a capsule transmitter which had borne "Secret" markings was removed by host government and retained by it. It must be assumed that due to close visual observation a number of people are aware that this was a reconnaissance vehicle of some sort.

6. The OSA team is returning to Headquarters as soon as possible. A list of further inquiries have been left with the Embassy Attache office, answers to which will be forwarded through Agency channels.

7. The ICPC is being convened Friday to consider various actions to be taken, among them an assessment of the effect of the exposure, and the preparation of a suitable reply to the Venezuelan Minister of Defense. Caracas station has also requested advance information on any release that might be issued.

8. The following attachments are provided for background:

a. A summary chronology of significant operations reporting during mission 1005.

b. A summary comments regarding reentry of the capsule.

c. A list of items missing from the capsule about which the Attache office in Caracas will make inquiries.

d. A chronology of action taken by OSA security staff from receipt of knowledge of the incident to the time a team was dispatched to Caracas to investigate.

e. Copies of cabled reports made by the Headquarters team.

9. A comprehensive report is being developed and will be available upon the completion of our investigation.

W. E. SWELSON

sw ALBERT D. WHEELON
Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology

Atts: As Stated

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Signature Recommended:

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AD/OSA

D/TECH/OSA/JParangosky:mvp (12 Aug 64)

Distribution:

- 1 - DCI (w/att)
- 2 - DDCI (w/att)
- 3 - ER (w/o att)
- 4 - DD/S&T (w/att)
- 5 - DD/S&T (w/o att)
- 6 - AD/OSA (w/att)
- 7 - D/TECH/OSA (w/att)
- 8 - APD/OSA (w/att)
- 9 - SS/OSA (w/att)
- 10 - Chrono (w/o att)
- 11 - RB/OSA (w/o att)

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SUMMARY CHRONOLOGY SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS REPORTING DURING
MISSION #1005

1964

- a. 27 April: CORONA/J Mission #1005 launched and an orbit verified.
- b. 28 April: (1) Telemetry indicates that neither main camera window doors ejected, precluding photography. Most probable cause: loss of partial pyro bus power at separation.
- (2) (a) On pass #9 indications from telemetry that slave camera film movement ceased at 350 cycles. This camera was placed in off mode to prevent damage to the system.
- (b) The main camera operation: normal.
- (3) Vehicle condition normal.
- c. 29 April: Telemetry data evaluation available indicates that an "electrical open" has occurred in pyro distribution plug as result of short occurring elsewhere.
- Significance:
- (1) No power has been or can be applied to pyros that eject camera doors.
- (2) High possibility that normal recovery cannot be accomplished because of requirement for pyro power to accomplish certain recovery events.

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- d. 29 April: Decision made to attempt to recover first capsule on pass #49.
- e. 1 May: Recovery attempt made on pass #49 with negative results, i.e. no indication of separation of first capsule.
- f. 2 May: Recovery attempt made on pass #64, with no indication of separation of capsule. Decided that operational mission is considered terminated. The orbiting vehicle, henceforth, will be used for further failure analysis and to exercise the deactivate/reactivate capability.
- g. 2 May -
20 May: Additional attempts were made to command the recovery of the first capsule with negative results on passes 79, 95, 110, 112, 119, 126, 142, 174, 221, 246, 269, 271, 285, 286, 319, 333, 335, 340, 342, 347, 349, 356, 359, 363, and 365. No further attempt to command the vehicle was attempted.
- h. 18 May: An Air Force message from the Satellite Control Center, Sunnyvale, California, reported that Mission 1005 (labeled space track object #796) is predicted to reentry, based upon an assumed tumbling condition drag factor, on pass 450, 26 May, plus or minus 8 passes.

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- i. 25 May: An Air Force message from the Satellite Control Center, Sunnyvale, California, reported that Mission #1005 (space track object #796) is predicted to reenter on pass #452, ascending, on 26 May at 0411Z (confidence bracket time 0330Z to 0430Z) and impact in area 23.6N and 70.3W.

~~SECRET~~SUMMARY COMMENTS OF MISSION 1005 RE-ENTRY

1. CORONA/J Mission #1005, according to space track reporting provided by the Satellite Control Center, Sunnyvale, California, decayed and entered the atmosphere on pass #452, 26 May.

a. At 0406Z a sighting from Maracaibo, Venezuela, reportedly observed five incendiary objects.

b. At 0413Z, the Moorestown, New Jersey, Spadats Station reported radar sightings of small residual objects on azimuth of 130 degrees at 2-8 degrees elevation.

c. Dew Line reported three radar "hits", object size unknown.

2. Due to a malfunction in Mission #1005, noted in attachment #a, recovery of the first capsule was attempted numerous times with no separation of the capsule effected. Recovery of a major portion of the first capsule from the Venezuelan Ministry of Defense leads to a conclusion that Mission #1005, normally decayed in orbit on pass #452, broke up on descent and impacted at least a capsule in Venezuela. The evidence thus far appears to indicate that the capsule

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
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did not deploy a parachute, but survived, though badly damaged, a free fall impact to earth. No evidence is available thus far concerning the impact area and fate of the second capsule and vehicle. Normally it has been assumed that Mission vehicles probably burn up and disintegrate upon decay and re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. It is probable that the ablative shield, which remained on the capsule during descent, protected the capsule and helped it survive re-entry.

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Boundaries are not necessarily those recognized by the U.S. Government.

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LIST OF ITEMS MISSING FROM CAPSULE

PARACHUTE

TRANSMITTER

THRUST CONE

GOLD DISKS

PLASTIC SHELL

FLASHING LIGHT

PORTION OF ABLATOR

MOST OF FIBER GLASS PARTS OF PARACHUTE COVER

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CHRONOLOGY OF OSA ACTIONS PURSUANT TO
KNOWLEDGE OF A DOWNED "C" VEHICLE
IN SOUTH AMERICA

5 August 1964

Between 1200 and 1300 hours a telephone call was received by [redacted] Security Staff, OSA, from [redacted] ADIC Security Representative to SAFSP (General Greer). [redacted] asked whether Headquarters was aware that remains of a satellite vehicle had been found in South America. [redacted] answered in the negative whereupon Newlun advised hearing of this by way of a morning staff meeting at SAFSP. Details were lacking. At this point, due to phone trouble, [redacted] was disconnected and Security Staff, OSA, couldn't immediately recontact him. Immediately, the Security Staff, OSA, contacted persons in OSA including Mr. Walter Lloyd, Acting Deputy Assistant Director, OSA, and Mr. John Parangosky, Deputy for Technology, OSA, who might have knowledge of the matter. They had no information.

3.3(h)(2)

When Security Staff, OSA, regained contact with [redacted] the latter stated his belief that information on the vehicle was available at offices of Colonel Worthman and [redacted] in NRO Staff. [redacted] felt that the possible launch involved was within the past six weeks. (Later checks by Security Staff, OSA, revealed that OSA had recovered everything launched in these six weeks.) The Deputy for Technology, OSA was in on the second conversation with [redacted]

Security Staff, OSA, checked with Mr. [redacted] Special Assistant for Liaison, OSA, and found that the subject of a downed vehicle was brought up by [redacted] at the DCI staff conference on 5 August where a Reuters dispatch on the subject was read.

3.3(h)(2)

At approximately 1430 Mr. [redacted] Deputy Chief, Security Staff, OSA, phoned Mr. Mazza, Security Officer, NRO, and queried him regarding the vehicle and any information pertaining to the matter. Mr. Mazza said that a message had come into the Pentagon (NRO Staff) the preceding day (4 August) which indicated that a U. S. satellite had landed in Venezuela about two weeks earlier. A copy of the message to which Mr. Mazza referred is attached. Mr. Mazza indicated that reports of this type are not uncommon (one every two or three months) and this one at

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first was discounted. Later, said Mazza, they received information that caused them some concern (possibly Reuters dispatch).

Mazza called back and indicated that, according to Gene Kiefer, Mr. McCone had brought up the topic at a USIB meeting and stated that as soon as there was more substantiating information he would send a technical team of people from NRO and CIA to investigate at the scene of the landing of the vehicle. Security Staff, OSA, reported to the Executive Officer, DD/S&T, the possibility of a downed DOD vehicle in Venezuela. The same information was reported to [redacted] Acting Deputy Assistant Director, OSA; [redacted] Deputy Director of Security and Mr. [redacted] Chief, Special Security Center. The Chief, Special Security Center, related that Mr. Mazza had advised that morning that there was a possibility of a vehicle down in Venezuela.

3.3(h)(2)

It was later learned by Security Staff, OSA, that Mr. Mazza had left three copies at the SSC of the original message to DIA dated 4 August. Learning this, the Security Staff, OSA, acquired one of the copies of this message and had it shown to Deputy for Technology, OSA; Assistant Director, OSA, and the Special Assistant for Liaison, OSA. Also complete information was given by phone to the Executive Officer, DD/S&T, and the Deputy Director of Security.

Mazza called again to relate that he had just gotten the information that a new organization called TIP had been organized at NORAD last month for the purpose of pinpointing direction and impact location of "garbage" re-entering the atmosphere. These people were practicing in May and had stated that a piece of something had re-entered on 28 May and landed in almost the same spot as the present discovery. This information was given to Executive Officer, DD/S&T, Deputy Director of Security, Assistant Director, OSA, and Deputy for Technology, OSA.

At approximately 1730 Mr. Mazza called and gave Security Staff, OSA, information that he had another message,

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this one from an attache in Caracas, Venezuela, stating that the attache had possession of one fragment of a space vehicle and had photographed another that was in the possession of a local newspaper. A local business man was quoted as saying it had landed two weeks before. A pilot and co-pilot of a civilian photomapping service were quoted as saying that, according to natives, it landed 24 November 1963. Mr. Mazza also pointed out that General Thomas, Air Force Intelligence, had asked for a word description of the vehicle.

Above was relayed to the Executive Officer, DD/S&T; Deputy Director of Security; Assistant Director, OSA; and the Special Assistant for Liaison, OSA.

6 August 1964

The Security Staff, OSA, received a call from Mr. Mazza at approximately 0830 stating that he had a message strongly indicating that downed capsule was DOD's. Mr. Mazza said he was sending message to OSA.

The information was relayed to EXO, DD/S&T; DDS; D/TECH/OSA, AD/OSA, and SAL/OSA.

Immediately upon receipt of the message at 1110, Security Staff, OSA, called Charles Goodell, Manager, LMSC/AP facility and gave him the identifying data for the downed vehicle with the request that he determine if the equipment could be related to any of our vehicles. At this time, Security Staff, OSA, put DCI and DDCI on distribution for all traffic on this incident. Within a half hour verification was received from Goodell that the downed vehicle was J-8. This was subsequently identified as the "A" Buckett of Mission 1005, launched on 27 April with the first recovery attempt made on 1 May on the 49th revolution. This recovery effort failed. Mr. Goodell was requested to verify this information by cable.

Above information immediately given via phone by Security Staff, OSA, to AD/OSA, SAL/OSA, EXO, DD/S&T, DD Security, Chief, SSC and Mr. Mazza in NRO.

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In talking to Mr. Mazza, permission of the NRO was solicited and later received to put all message traffic to and from Caracas regarding this problem in CIA channels for reasons of security and expeditious handling.

Another call was then made to the Executive Officer, DD/S&T, suggesting that we prepare a message to [redacted] telling him what he had in his area, and asking for his help, and asking him to put messages on this subject in the OSA channel. EXO, DD/S&T, asked Security Staff, OSA, to prepare the message and coordinate with him.

At approximately 1030 when it was discovered by Security Staff, OSA, that there had been further news articles in addition to the Reuters dispatch, it was recommended to Mr. Mazza that he recommend to the NRO a meeting of the ICPC group to discuss the security and cover ramifications of the incident. Mr. Mazza later advised that he had made recommendation to General Stewart who made same to Dr. McMillan. Dr. McMillan reportedly decided not to call such a meeting then, since Mr. McCone had stated the preceding day in a USIB meeting that he would send a technical team upon receipt of more information.

At approximately 1400 Mr. Mazza called Security Staff, OSA, to say that General Stewart had suggested that even though Dr. McMillan was not going to call a meeting of the contingency group that maybe a meeting should be called of lower level personnel to decide what had to be done. Security Staff, OSA, reminded Mr. Mazza that Dr. McMillan was the one who had the responsibility to call the meeting; and if someone was to have a meeting, OSA had its candidate to attend: [redacted] Special Assistant for Liaison, OSA. 3.3(h)(2)

Mr. Mazza later called and left a message for Security Staff, OSA, asking, "Were we going to have a meeting." This call was later returned and Mr. Mazza was told by Security Staff, OSA, that if they called a meeting we would send a representative.

At approximately 1530 a message to [redacted] giving the latter instructions was prepared by Security Staff, OSA, and coordinated with Deputy for Technology, OSA, and Acting Deputy Assistant Director, OSA, and

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was handcarried to the Executive Officer, DD/S&T, where it was left for his coordination and release.

At 1900 the Assistant Director of OSA attempted to call the DD/S&T and the EXO, DD/S&T, and found them unavailable.

At approximately 1815 Deputy Chief, Security Staff, OSA, received a call from the EXO, DD/S&T, stating that there were more ramifications (political) to the problem, and the DD/S&T had indicated that he wasn't going to sign the message that night.

The Deputy Chief, Security Staff, OSA, upon hearing of the return of the Assistant Director, OSA, went to him and pointed out the problem and urgency of the situation in light of press interest and non-witting people in Caracas.

In the interim at approximately 1500 Security Staff, OSA, requested Chief. Commo. OSA. to prepare a pilot message to the [redacted]

[redacted] outlining the commo procedures for handling CORONA traffic. This message went out at approximately 1600.

3.3(h)(2)

7 August 1964

At approximately 1000 the Executive Officer, DD/S&T, called Security Staff, OSA, and requested that a team be selected to include a technical man from OSA and the technical man from NRO who had been previously identified and a Security man from OSA who had previously been identified. The Deputy Chief, Security Staff, OSA. was asked to rewrite the message to [redacted] to include the team members by name. The Executive Officer asked that the new draft be sent to him for coordination.

3.3(h)(2)

The new message was prepared and coordinated in OSA with the Deputy for Technology and the Special Assistant for Liaison, and the Executive Officer, DD/S&T, at approximately 1200. The latter coordinated, and it was sent to the Security Officer, DD/P, at approximately 1245.

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It was returned to OSA at approximately 1600 after going to the DD/P office who sent it to the Deputy Chief/WH. It was immediately released in OSA and went out at 1625.

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